

ASPIS

Advanced Superyacht Defense

PIRACY EVOLVING

Understanding Today's Piracy Threats for Superyachts



**ILLEGAL
TRAFFICKING OF
IMMIGRANTS AND
REFUGEES BY SEA**

**WHAT AFTER ISIS?
CONSEQUENCES
FOR THE WEST**

**MARITIME
TERRORISM
HISTORY,
TYPOLOGY AND
CONTEMPORARY
THREATS**

WELCOME TO



**A valuable source of information about security,
defense, training, and assistance on Superyacht
security for Owners, Captains, and Crews.**

**Free subscriptions are available by filling the form
at www.aspis-superyachts.com**



PABLO FERRERO

EDITORS LETTER

WELCOME TO ASPIS

Since the first days of sailing, mankind has enjoyed the beauty and the peace that the ocean can offer him. He has relished the adventure of discovering new shores. He has found purpose in the thrill of sailing through storms and the camaraderie found with other sailors that share his same passion.

Since the first days of sailing, another group of people has understood a different opportunity that the ocean offers them. These people have sought to obtain what is not theirs. The pirates.

For years I have been part of the luxury yachting community, enjoying the beauty of sailing with friends, feeling the salty sea breeze on my face and the waves beneath my feet. But during the last few years, a major concern has begun to come to mind. Considering the world's political situation, this uneasy feeling has reached a level where I have realized I need to start doing something.

One beautiful night in Monaco, while sharing dinner with a good friend and her guests, I met Dimitris, a passionate man of the sea that shares my same concern with piracy and has much more information than me. I came to realize that we need to create a communication channel to share these concerns with our community—valuable information specially written for the superyacht community, information that will help prevent and avoid threats while at sea and on shore.

Welcome to ASPIS, a communication channel about superyacht security matters, expressly created for the superyacht community.

Pablo Ferrero

FEATURES



PIRACY EVOLVING

Page: 8



ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES BY SEA ROUTES

Page: 20



WHAT AFTER ISIS? CONSEQUENCES FOR THE WEST

Page: 28

CONTRIBUTORS

KLEANTHIS KYRIAKIDIS

Commander, Hellenic Navy, serving as Director of Studies, Hellenic Naval War College. Among others he has served as an advisor to the Deputy Minister of Defense. He holds three Masters' Degrees, two from the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, Ca, and a MPA from Harvard Kennedy School of Government. His PhD research is on Political Islam. He published seven history and political science books and more than 250 articles mainly in American and Greek journals. He has taught to various Institutions.

ANESTIS ANESTIS

Captain, Hellenic Navy. He graduated from the Hellenic Naval Academy on 1991 and he served in various types of Frigates, Fast Patrol Boats and Replenishment Ship as Operations Officer, Executive Officer and as Commanding Officer. He has a specialized professional education concerning security and intelligence issues. He has the YACHTMASTER OFFSHORE diploma by RYA.

DIMITRIS RAFTOGIANNIS

Captain, Hellenic Navy, class 1990. Captain and Executive Officer on various types of war vessels. Director of Hellenic Fleet Operations Center, Director of Studies at Hellenic Naval War College. He lectures on Leadership in private and public sector. Holds a MPA from Harvard Kennedy School of Government, a Master on National Security from Supreme War College, HNDGS, and a BA in International Relations, Athens University. Is a Marine Auditor and a Yachtmaster Offshore – RYA.

STAFF

ASPIS is a proud member of NAVIS Media Network

Year 1 - Number 1 - October / November 2017

EDITORIAL

General Director: Pablo Ferrero
Editor in Chief: Dimitris Raftogiannis

CONTRIBUTOR

Kleanthis Kyriakidis, Nick Kasimatis,
 Anestis Anestis

Art Director: Gabriel Parra

Photography: Pablo Ferrero
 High Contrast

Advertising: ASPIS-Superyachts.com

Letters/Comments: info@aspis-superyachts.com

General Enquiries: info@aspis-superyachts.com

Suscription Enquiries: info@aspis-superyachts.com

Telephone: +1 786 406 6111

Website: www.ASPIS-Superyachts.com

ASPIS is a member of the NAVIS Media Network and published by Flat World Communication LLC. Copyright Flat World Communication LLC. ISSN 2160-7966, All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without prior written permission from the publisher is strictly prohibited. Great care has been taken throughout the magazine to be accurate, but the publisher cannot accept any responsibility for any errors or omissions which might occur. Although every care is taken with manuscripts and photographs submitted.

ASPIS ISSN 2160-7958 (Print)

ASPIS ISSN 2160-7966 (Online)

ASPIS is a bimonthly publication:

Flat World Communication LLC

201 S. Biscayne Blvd., 28th Fl, Miami, Florida, 33131

t. +1 (305) 913 1337



MARITIME TERRORISM HISTORY, TYPOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY THREATS

Page: 35

NICK KASIMATIS

Captain, Hellenic Navy class 90'. He served in all types of Guided Missile Boats as Commanding Officer. He has extended and specialized professional education by the FOST, UK NAVY on piracy, intruders, VIP protection and immigrant handling. He holds MS of Management from SALVE REGINA Uni. RI, USA, Certification from HARVARD UNIVERSITY, MA USA, YACHTMASTER OFFSHORE diploma (RYA). He speaks English, French and Italian.

Superyacht Crews Security Training Program 2018

2018 Courses:

- Perfect Safe Room
- Protection at Anchorage
- Restricting Access Onboard the Yacht
- Boarding Avoidance
- Anti-Robbery Technics
- Spotting the Intruder
- Preventive Actions Prior Sailing
- Evasive Maneuvering
- Bomb Found Onboard
- Immigrants Handling
- Immigrants Confining
- Contagious Agents
- Basic negotiation skills

Playing roles in security scenarios:

A series of specially planned drills and exercises conducted at appropriate intervals taking into account the yacht type, personnel, port facilities to be visited and other relevant circumstances. Debriefing after scenario unfolds – lessons identified – lessons learned together with our experts.

t: +1 786 406 6111

@: info@asd-superyachts.com

ASD-Superyachts.com

Headquarters:

201 S. Biscayne Blvd. 28fl

Miami - 33131FL

Education centers in Monaco.

Offices in America, Europe, and Asia

We are specialized in on board and in class crew training. Every yacht is different, and every training program is specially designed and customised for each yacht and crew. Our bespoke education programs are specially written and designed for each particular yacht.

All courses offered by our company are written by security specialists for each yacht, after a deep study of its architecture, crew, uses, and frequent destinations.

Each course includes:


- 1- On board or in classroom lesson, with instructors who combine over 110 years of experience in maritime security,
- 2- A printed and digital Quick Reference Guide for the Crew,
- 3- A printed and digital Step by Step Manual for the Captain,
- 4- A continuing education program, based on our proprietary online learning platform, where every yacht has its private, secure area, where the crew can access refreshing courses and pass a periodic exam. Captains will have access to the student's information and exams grades to understand the level of training of his crew.
- 5- A New Crew online training program, where the new crew member has to pass a series of courses as a first approach to understand the security plan for your specific vessel, based on the training program taken by the rest of the crew.
- 6- Every crew member will receive a certification (Diploma) of every course taken, and will be registered in the database of trained crews.

Our clients receive a 24/7 phone support service available for captains and crews, attended by our maritime security experts, to support the vessel when facing a threat.

Supported by:

NAVIS





Definition

The Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, December 1982) states that piracy is the following:

Any unlawful act of violence, detention or any act of seizure committed for private purposes by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft and directed:

On the open sea, against another ship or aircraft or against persons or assets on board the ship or aircraft.

Against a ship, aircraft, person or property, in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state.

Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or aircraft, knowing the facts that make the ship or aircraft piratical.

Any act of incitement or deliberate facilitation of an act referred in the above paragraphs of the article.

The same convention refers to the definition of a pirated ship or aircraft as follows:

“A ship shall be considered as pirated if the persons exercising effective control of it intend to commit one of the acts referred to above”.

BY NICK KASIMATIS

PIRACY EVOLVING

Photography: Pablo Ferrero

Nowadays it is commonly accepted that we live in a world where not clear periods of war or peace exist, so there are not defined interim periods of peace between them. Nevertheless, the whole modern world, with the menace of new asymmetric threats, seems to be in a state of constant disruption. This new kind of “asymmetrical” war is certain that it is not governed by the doctrines of war theorists, such as Mahan and Clausewitz, who spoke of tactics and strategies in the context of a constitutionalized war of earlier times. Modern foe at sea is now terrorism and illegal activities in the form of pirates, smugglers, fanatic religious groups and all kinds of illegal groups that prove to be particularly dangerous and effective in their incessant activity. The 20th century saw the birth and development of the phenomenon of terrorism, as we perceive it today. The rapid technological progress that has become accessible to most people through international trade and communications has helped to develop this phenomenon. Moreover, piracy, as it is today, constitutes the greatest threat in the seas. Unlike the pirates of the old age, whose sole purpose was material profit, modern pirates, beyond that, have ideological foundations and there is clear evidence that they have a political and religious agenda as well as links with terrorist groups.

Areas of Pirate attacks

South - Central America and the Caribbean

There is a relatively limited number of pirate attacks at the coasts of these areas. Pirates aim at robbery of assets or money from the crew or the passengers. They usually attack when ships are anchored or harness in ports. Countries with the highest proportion of problems on the basis of statistics are Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Panama.

In Brazil armed gang members board merchant vessels and yachts usually when in port but also when underway in close distance from coast. High risk areas are the Amazon estuary, the Santos area and Villa do Conte area.

In Venezuela the tankers at anchor are the preferred targets, especially in Puerto la Cruz.

Pirate attacks are also recorded in the Caribbean Sea mainly in the Port Au Prince area. Alike, the pirates aim

South - Central America and the Caribbean. Pirates seek to seize valuables, electronic devices and / or cash.

Piracy in Southeast Asia is associated with criminal syndicates in China and Japan like the infamous Yakuza. Yet another even more concerning fact is the close ties of modern piracy in the area with Islamic terrorism organizations like the Abu Sayyaf Group.

on money and assets. Given the fact that the area is a pole of attraction for many yachts and sailing boats, pirates seek to seize valuables, electronic devices and / or cash.

Southeast Asia

Since the late of 20th century, piracy has dynamically made its appearance in Asia. In the wider region of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, pirate attacks on ships are particularly favored by the geographical factor. It is noted that the island’s clusters of this region are about 17,500 for Indonesia and 7,000 for the Philippines. The Malacca straits, between Malaysia and Indonesia, have become the focus of pirate activity since the 1980s, culminating in 2003. This is the most dangerous point for merchant ships and yachts, a relatively narrow and difficult to navigate sea. It is estimated that each year cross the area 50,000 to 90,000 ships, carrying half of the annual oil production and one third of the goods transported worldwide.

Pirates in the area (mainly fishermen) as a mean use a type of small boat made by bamboo. Bamboos are joined together to create a sort of “bridge” that allows them to climb easily on the target ship as it moves slowly. In 2004 a staggering 40 percent of all pirate attacks took place in Malacca straits. The phenomenon persists, yet less


intensive due to naval patrols in the area and close cooperation of coastal countries in intelligence sharing and coordination of naval forces.

Piracy in Southeast Asia is associated with criminal syndicates in China and Japan like the infamous Yakuza. Yet another even more concerning fact is the close ties of modern piracy in the area with Islamic terrorism organizations like the Abu Sayyaf Group. The so called “*piracy by terrorism*” seems like a new trend worldwide which will have enormous consequences on global trade if not addressed decisively and in a timely manner.

Africa – Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden

On the African continent there is a remarkable pirate activity in the East and the West coast.

Somali pirates have attacked hundreds of vessels in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean region, especially from 2007 to 2010, though most attacks did not result in a successful hijacking. In 2008, there were 111 attacks which included 42 successful hijackings. The rate of attacks in January and February 2009 was about 10 times higher than during the same period in 2008 and, indicatively, there have been almost daily attacks in March with 79 attacks, 21 successful, by mid-April. Most of these attacks occurred in the Gulf of Aden but subsequently the pirates



Maritime Crime Attacks Registered for the First Quarter of 2017

87 Incidents Reported

63 Vessels Boarded


63 Hostage

41 Kidnapped


Attacks with Major Consequences




Attacks with Minor Consequences



Foiled Attacks and Suspicious Approaches



All Reported Incidents





Africa – Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. In 2008, there were 111 attacks which included 42 successful hijackings. The rate of attacks in January and February 2009 was about 10 times higher than during the same period in 2008 and, indicatively, there have been almost daily attacks in March with 79 attacks, 21 successful, by mid-April.

increased their range and started attacking ships as far south as off the coast of Kenya in the Indian Ocean and as far east as the Gulf of Oman and the coast of Indian sub-continent. The huge ransoms paid by ship-owners and the extremely high cost to global trade forced the international community to decide for the formation of an ant-piracy coalition with warships patrolling the area, especially the Gulf of Aden. Before that, the shipping companies decided to hire armed security personnel onboard their vessels for protection purposes. As a result of the above measures piracy incidents started to significantly drop since 2010. In 2017 there is only one hijacking, there are still numerous attempts though not allowing for complacency and underlying the fact that the threat of piracy is still there. It has to be mentioned that, given the situation in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Syria is highly likely that now piracy is in some way related to terrorism and vice versa, just like it happens in Southeast Asia. The phenomenon of "*piracy by terrorism*" is on the rise globally as it seems that terrorist organizations like ISIS and the still relevant Al – Qaida expand their activities in the maritime realm. The recent formation of Al – Qaida Indian Subcontinent is a very warning sign for the region. Yet it is unclear how many of the pirate attacks in the area are associated with terrorism but it is likely that the deterioration of ISIS situation in Syria and Iraq and the decrease of its revenues by oil smuggling, forces the organization to seek other sources of money. In this regard, "*piracy by terrorism*" is anticipated to increase in the near future in terms of numbers and in new areas of maritime interest.

The West Coast of Africa - Gulf of Guinea particularly - is of great interest for piracy related groups. This is because there is a direct link with the geopolitics of energy. Nigeria and Angola are the two largest oil producing countries in Africa. Together with Gabon, Cameroon, Congo and Equatorial Guinea, surround the Guinea Bay. The pirates in this area do not negotiate for ransom, they are interested in stealing the cargo, usually oil. They are extremely brutal and often kill crewmembers for no reason. Unlike the East African Coast where piracy is in constant decline since 2010, piracy in Gulf of Guinea is on the rise. It is believed that the fearsome Nigeria's militant Islamist group Boko Haram which recently proclaimed Nigeria a Caliphate, associated with Al Qaida and ISIS, is involved in many of the pirate incidents in the Gulf of Guinea. Again, "*piracy by terrorism*" is evident here and in essence entirely unchecked due to the lack of proper Coast Guard and Naval forces by the coastal states.

The phenomenon of "*piracy by terrorism*" is on the rise globally as it seems that terrorist organizations like ISIS and the still relevant Al – Qaida expand their activities in the maritime realm.

Causes of Piracy

A number of causes are responsible for the existence of piracy, among which could be highlighted the underdevelopment and poverty that plague countries directly or indirectly linked to piracy. The low economic growth in these countries is driving the rise of crime. The reasons for this impoverishment are:

The widening inequality between wealthy developed countries and poor developing countries due to globalization.

Over-exploitation of natural resources.

The degradation of the natural environment of the poor countries, by dropping toxic, nuclear, industrial and even hospital waste from the developed countries. The sea pollution leaves the fishermen without means of survival thus turning them to unlawful acts like piracy.

Moreover, the expanding links between piracy and terrorism, which takes the phenomenon of piracy to a higher level as it ties it to religious issues, is something that has to be under serious consideration by the international community. Piracy by terrorists is not new but after a lull for some years it returns revitalized as can be seen in

Asia, East and West Africa and elsewhere. Main cause for this re appearance is the collapse of the Caliphate of ISIS in Syria and Iraq which forces transnational jihadists to flee to other theaters of jihad like Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Mali, Nigeria where they join existing terrorist networks. Even worse, many of the jihadists fleeing from Syria and Iraq try to return to their home countries like France, Germany, the UK and Belgium where they organize new or join existing cells. Moreover, hundreds of fighters are waiting in Turkey to enter Europe. All these battle hardened and experienced fighters will increase the capability for more sophisticated and well planned attacks either by lone wolves or bigger groups. The maritime realm is of much interest to them because vessels and port facilities are “soft” targets as being largely unprotected. A pirated megayacht or cruise ship full of passengers serves the need for revenue and makes the headlines while at the same time a suicide attack against a huge tanker or LNG vessel is quite spectacular as the terrorists “want many to watch, not necessarily many to die”.



Pirate's course of Action

When a pirate attack occurs, pirates could act as follows:

- Initially, they embark on the ship while it is sailing or anchored.
- They seize money from the ship's crew and passengers or other valuable items.
- They take hostages and / or kidnap individuals (crew members - passengers) to obtain ransoms.
- In many cases, they commit murders for terrorism and exemplification purposes (West Africa).
- They carry out robberies beyond the above-mentioned, taking ship's equipment.
- They negotiate with owners for ransom to free the vessel and the crew.
- They steal the ship's cargo (West Africa).

As mentioned above, pirates with hostage-taking and kidnapping of crew or passengers are aiming to obtain a ransom. At the negotiation stage, pirates act as follows:

- Their spokesman during negotiations claims that the situation is uncontrolled by him.
- To exert more pressure, they are threatening the captain of the ship or other crew members or passengers.
- They allow crew members to communicate with their relatives, in order to increase pressure and engage the media, aiming on wider influence of the public opinion.
- Under the fear of potential rescue operation and for higher security, they usually move the ship from the attack area.

In case of compromise and until 2008, the ransom was handed over by a neutral

authority or mediator. Since 2008 the delivery of the ransom has been done directly by air.

Responding to Piracy by the International Community - Applying International Law - International Cooperation to Address Piracy

As part of the fight against piracy, IMO issues aggregated reports (from those issued by its member states) on piracy and armed robbery against ships, which contain descriptions of incidents, to help the prevention of future incidents. The IMO has also issued the Best Management Practices (BMPs) that ships must follow to prevent and better tackle piracy incidents while its legal department processes various legal issues related to piracy and provides guidance to governments.

In addition, various Naval Forces were deployed in the Gulf of Aden and East coast of Africa to tackle piracy in the region under the EU umbrella like ATALANTA, the Combined Task Force 150 and 151 under NATO and more. The presence of these Naval Forces was key for reducing the piracy incidents in Indian Ocean.

Responding to Piracy by Private Entities

Many shipping companies hire private security companies to protect their vessels by armed security personnel. This has serious legal and political implications.

The use of lethal force to protect a vessel depends on:

- The legal framework of the flag state of the ship.
- The legal framework of the state of which the involved persons are nationals.



STELLA MARIS

A key factor on all the above is a well-trained crew. A not properly trained crew stands no chances. It has to be mentioned here that the ISPS code which hastily came in force in 2004 in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks can be useful in enhancing the implementation of security measures onboard vessels but still does not provide for proper training and nowadays is seen as a procedural obligation by most of seafarers and the maritime community.

- The legal framework of the states the ports of which a ship is approaching.

States have different views among them on the use of force issue. In general, the relevant laws are based on the logic that the use of lethal force is allowed only in cases of self-defense and only if life is directly threatened.

Simple Measures to Combat Piracy

In tackling piracy, prevention has an important role to play, that is practices and measures that should be followed by shipowners, captains and crews during every trip described in Best Management Practices issued by IMO.

Measures to suppress a pirate attack should not be based on and linked to the use of force. In the event that a piracy attempt occurs, since the use of force is not allowed as a course of action, the following are some of the practices:

- Implementation of pre-planned measures against the threat.
- Early alarm signaling and whistle usage.
- Direct reporting and transmitting of emergency signals to any competent authority, other nearby ships and naval forces patrolling the area. It is necessary to accurately provide the name, position

and condition of the ship.

- Follow instructions which have been sent by the appropriate authorities to address the situation.
- Take photos, videos to transmit to relevant government agencies (if feasible).
- Use flares and sudden illumination of the suspicious vessel if it is dark.
- Make escape maneuvers, increase speed, and if it is possible cause waves with maneuvers.
- Use of CCTV and special ship control systems.
- Use of water pumps as a means of repelling.

Of course there is a lot more to be done to protect a vessel from piracy incidents.

A key factor on all the above is a well-trained crew. A not properly trained crew stands no chances. It has to be mentioned here that the ISPS code which hastily came in force in 2004 in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks can be useful in enhancing the implementation of security measures onboard vessels but still does not provide for proper training and nowadays is seen as a procedural obligation by most of seafarers and the maritime community.

Many shipping companies hire private security companies to protect their vessels by armed security personnel. This has serious legal and political implications.

A photograph of a modern yacht interior. The scene is dimly lit with blue and purple ambient lighting. In the foreground, there's a wooden deck with a metal railing. In the middle ground, there's a lounge area with several dark-colored armchairs and ottomans, some with green cushions. A small table holds a bottle and some items. In the background, there's a curved wall with a large window or opening, and a staircase with wooden steps and a metal railing on the right side.

Cost of Piracy

The financial cost of piracy consists of:

- **The ransom in case of piracy**
- **The higher costs for insurances**
- **The re-routing cost**
- **The cost of increased speed**
- **The cost of labor**
- **The cost of capturing and imprisoning pirates**
- **The cost for hiring Private Maritime Security Companies in High Risk Areas.**

Conclusion

History and serious global geopolitical developments indicate that piracy as a threat in various forms will remain with us for years to come. In this regard all vessels must increase their level of security and self-protection measures. There is a need crews to be prepared and trained to prevent and confront piracy which most likely has evolved nowadays to be associated to terrorism. It is useful to keep in mind that every illegal act against a vessel in the open sea, her cargo, crew and passengers is deemed piracy.

In the face of evolving threats like “*piracy by terrorism*” there is a need for experienced personnel who can provide their expertise to shipping companies, management companies and owners. Their role among others will be to advise the captains on security issues, supervise and organize the ship’s self-defense, develop physical obstacles to prevent the

boarding of potential pirates/terrorists and train the crew on defense methods using non-lethal weapons. Provision of this kind of training will have a positive effect on the crew’s morale by adding an extra level of security, situational awareness and alertness. This increases vessel’s defenses and makes it difficult for pirates or other criminals to embark thus reducing the chances of a successful hijack or other unpleasant situations.

Moreover, the enhancement of the passive defense capacity of a vessel can be ensured by the smart use of high tech, low cost, crew friendly tools.

In any case, training, technology and situational awareness can efficiently protect a vessel, since it can deter an attack if the general impression to someone who intends to attack is of a well organized crew ready to confront an external threat.

Bibliography – Websites - Articles

- 1.«Dead men tell no tales», The Economist , December 18th 1999.
2. Eugene Kontorovich, Feb. 2010, «A GUANTÁNAMO ON THE SEA: THE DIFFICULTY OF PROSECUTING PIRATES AND TERRORISTS» California Law Review.
- 3.«Tanker hijackings on the rise», ICC worldwide, London, 26 June 1998
4. Alexandra Schwartz, 2009, «Corsairs in the Crosshairs: A Strategic Plan to Eliminate Modern Day Piracy» New York University School of Law.
- 5.«China Piracy : Government Takes Hard Line», BBC World Service, December 22nd 1999
6. Weeks Stanley «Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and Access», University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. Weekly Piracy Report.
7. Renwick Neil -Jason Abbot «Piratical Violence and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia», Security Dialogue, Vol. 30, 2. 1999.
- 8.«Anti-piracy tracking device to be introduced», ICC worldwide, Paris, 5 Feb. 1999.
9. Seo-Hang Lee, «Security of SLOCs in East Asia», University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.
10. Marine Watch Institute, «Phantom ships: piracy’ s newest twist in Asia»
11. European Union Naval Force. «Website of Greek Coast Guard.»
12. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, (ICoC- PSP).
13. M. Murphy. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: The Challenge of Piracy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009
14. International Maritime Organization - International Maritime Bureau : Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships : Annual Report 1998, London:1998.

BY ANESTIS ANESTIS
ILLEGAL
TRAFFICKING OF
IMMIGRANTS AND
REFUGEES BY SEA
ROUTES

Photography: Pablo Ferrero

Every year thousands of immigrants or refugees leave their homelands and travel many miles by sea in an attempt to find better living and work conditions or seeking international protection against threats to their life. These desperate people very often risk their lives using overcrowded, old and decrepit vessels as they try to reach to their destination (in most of cases are the Southern European countries). Many of them do not manage to reach their final destination as accidents are common and many lives are lost at sea.

The purpose of this article is to highlight the problem caused from the illegal movement of migrants and refugees via sea and to focus to the effects it has on merchant shipping and yachts sailing in the Mediterranean Sea.





The United Nations (UN) 1951 Refugee Convention, in article 1.A.2, adopted the following definition of “refugee” to apply to any person who:

“Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”



The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in addition to the 1951 definition, recognizes such persons as refugees: “Who are outside their country of nationality or habitual residence and unable to return there owing to serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from generalized violence or events seriously disturbing public order.”

On the other hand immigration is the international movement of people into a destination country of which they are not natives or where they do not possess

Published 06 January 2017

363,342
arrivals by sea in 2016

5,079
dead/missing



citizenship in order to settle or reside there, especially as permanent residents or naturalized citizens, or to take-up employment as a migrant worker or temporarily as a foreign worker.

Illegal immigration is the entry of a person or a group of persons across a country's border, in a way that violates the immigration laws of the destination country, with the intention to remain in the country.

Nowadays some of the major mass migrations routes are Mediterranean Sea Route, Central American Route and Southeast Asian Route. During this


period of time the Mediterranean Sea is the most interesting area concerning the illegal immigration and refugees who use the sea routes to move.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) at the beginning of the year 2017 reported preliminary totals for all 2016 migrant and refugee arrivals to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, as well as estimated fatalities. Arrival totals were 363,348 split almost evenly between Italy and Greece, with much smaller numbers arriving in Malta, Cyprus and Spain. Fatalities and missing migrants reached at least 5,079.

MEDITERRANEAN UPDATE

Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals and Fatalities

International Organizations for Migration - The UN Migration Agency





MEDITERRANEAN UPDATE

Migration Flows Europe: Arrivals and Fatalities

International Organizations for Migration - The UN Migration Agency

Published 14 July 2017



6,973
Arrivals

86,121
Arrivals

9,723
Arrivals

Deaths
114

Deaths
2206

Deaths
37

IOM believes many more deaths at sea may have gone unreported last year – in the Mediterranean and elsewhere – particularly between North Africa and Spain, where data collection often has been sporadic and many smaller vessels are believed to have been lost without detection (source <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-top-363348-2016-deaths-sea-5079>).

IOM also reports that 103,175 migrants and refugees entered Europe by sea in 2017 through 12 July, with almost 85 per cent arriving in Italy and the remainder divided between Greece, Cyprus and Spain. This compares with 240,014 arrivals across the region through 12 July 2016 (source <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-103175-2017-2357-deaths>).

From the above, we conclude that the illicit trafficking of migrants and refugees via sea routes poses serious risks to their lives but it also affects the safety of ships sailing in these areas.

What, however, is the impact on the safety of ships and crews from the illegal transit of migrants and refugees with unseaworthy vessels?

In accordance with the law of the sea the captain of the vessel has the obligation to offer assistance to any person found at sea in danger. More specifically the United Nations

Convention on the Law Of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) in Article 98 paragraph 1 (Duty to render assistance) provides that:

1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:

(a) To render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;

(b) To proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him;

(c) After a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it will call.

Also the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention 1974) in Regulation 33 refers that :

“The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide assistance on receiving information from any source that persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance, if possible informing them or the search and rescue service

that the ship is doing so. This obligation to provide assistance applies regardless of the nationality or status of such persons or the circumstances in which they are found. If the ship receiving the distress alert is unable or, in the special circumstances of the case, considers it unreasonable or unnecessary to proceed to their assistance, the master must enter in the log-book the reason for failing to proceed to the assistance of the persons in distress, taking into account the recommendation of the Organization, to inform the appropriate search and rescue service accordingly.”

When a ship is required to provide assistance to a ship in distress, the captain must have taken account of various issues such as the safety of the ship and her crew, its assistance capabilities and what other actions it he should take concerning the provision of information to the competent authorities.

However, often the captain is confused about his exact responsibility and his crew responsibility when detecting a vessel at risk in the sea, especially when this vessel appears to be full of migrants or refugees.

For this purpose a guide to principles and practice as applied to refugees and

migrants has been prepared jointly by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The guide is available in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish (<http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Facilitation/personsrescued/Pages/Default.aspx>).

The guide outlines some of the main actions that a captain must take when requested to provide assistance to the rescue of persons in distress at sea (such as to check the ship’s equipment, the implementation of the plans and procedures concerning the safety and security of the crew and the ship, the provision to the local Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) of all necessary information etc).

An important factor that a ship’s captain has to take into account when providing assistance to a ship in distress, not mentioned in this handbook, is the possibility that the refugees and migrants traveling without documentation are often facilitated by smugglers, who in some cases may be dangerous and armed.

To deal with such a possible case, the

Illegal trafficking of people by sea in the coming years is expected to increase

captain and crew should be in alert to detect the suspect behavior of such individuals and be prepared to react appropriately.

A very important issue is the area of concentration and accommodation of the survivors. This site must be chosen on the basis of both the safety of these people and of the ship and her crew. Also, a plan with certain duties for the crew, preplanned actions and necessary equipment to confine the immigrants (especially the dangerous ones) must exist, in order to ensure the vessel's safety.

Among other issues that a captain will be required to handle is also to provide health care to people in need. The immigrants or the refugees may be suffering from hypothermia and dehydration or starvation as well as from bodily injuries. But what deserves particular attention is that some of the survivors may be suffering from contagious diseases. In any case the crew must treat them with humanity within the capabilities and limitations of the vessel. In order to deal with these incidents, the appropriate pharmaceutical and sanitary equipment should be available on board.

Finally, an important factor that must always be taken into account is the issue of the religion of these people, a very important detail in order to avoid any bad reactions from the rescued persons to keep them calm and cooperative.

In any case, a ship's captain may decide not to travel to areas considered to be high risk of trafficking of refugees and migrants.

CONCLUSION

Crossing maritime borders using unseaworthy boats is an extremely dangerous experience. Illegal trafficking of people by sea in the coming years is expected to increase exponentially and is going to affect seafarers who are sailing in respective areas, especially in the Mediterranean. The rescue of refugees and migrants at risk in the sea is a challenge for the captain and the crew because it can affect both the safety of seafarers and guests and the ship. Equally important, it is necessary to know the obligations and responsibilities arising from the international conventions. Therefore, knowledge, proper preparation and continuous training of the crews can prevent unpleasant situations for the ships and those onboard.

BY DIMITRIS RAFTOGIANNIS

What after ISIS? Consequences for the West


Photography: Pablo Ferrero, High Contrast

The fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq is continuing resulting in big loses for the terrorist organization. It loses territory, strongholds and hundreds of its fighters. The fight for Mosul is over with ISIS forces suffering heavy casualties. At the same time the offensive against Raqqa, its capital city, continues. The loss of Raqqa to alliance forces will be a major blow to likely determine the future of the so called caliphate. The caliphate is being crushed but its collapse will have serious consequences for the West as its fighters will travel to western countries as well as unstable regions to continue jihad one way or another.

Some months ago the former FBI Director James Comey acknowledged “the caliphate will be crushed...” and the result “will be a terrorist diaspora sometime in the next two to five years like we’ve never seen before.”







Who are the terrorists that will be dispersed all over the world?

It is mainly foreign fighters who travelled from more than 80 countries to join the battle in Syria and Iraq under the ISIS banner. After ISIS collapses most of them will leave the region to continue the jihad participating in wars elsewhere or conducting terrorist attacks mainly in western countries.

Today, they are estimated to be around 30000. For comparison reasons it is reminded here that during the Soviet – Afghan conflict in the 1980s the foreign fighters' estimated number was 5000 to 20000. After the Afghan war was over it was those fighters who formed al-Qaeda and later fought in Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina and even Chechnya. The foreign fighters to emerge from the conflict in Syria and Iraq will act in a more or less same way wishing to leave behind a similar legacy.

6000 out of the estimated 30000 foreign fighters who currently participate in the conflict in Syria and Iraq under ISIS flag come from western countries, mainly France, Germany, the UK and Belgium. These 6000 pose a deadly threat for the West as most of them

will want to return to their home countries after the conclusion of the fight. And it is anticipated they will use their expertise and skills to recruit and organize terrorist attacks. Even if the so called caliphate is dissolute it will continue to be a reference point for all Islamic extremists and jihadists as it will remain alive in the form of a virtual caliphate in the internet and its message will persist through social media thus inspiring Islamic fundamentalism worldwide.

What the foreign fighters are going to do after the caliphate collapses in Syria and Iraq?

Some of them will remain in the area joining the next Salafist – jihadist group that emerges, whatever this is. For some others, loyal to both ISIS and al-Qaeda, joining al-Qaeda will be the strongest option, if not the only option.

Yet, another group of foreign fighters will travel abroad to continue the jihad in unstable and barely governed countries like Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and regions like West Africa or Caucasus.

But the most dangerous and threatening group for the West is the foreign fighters – citizens of western states – returning to their home countries. Upon their return they will try to radicalize more youth, recruit new members, re activate dormant or create new networks and plan, organize and execute terrorist attacks. The grave threat that this group of fighters pose for western countries is more than obvious. It is worth reminding that the Bataclan theatre attack in Paris in 2015 was planned and conducted by foreign fighters who received training in Syria. According to secret services estimates hundreds of them are already back in their home countries while thousands more are expected to attempt to infiltrate the western societies in the near future, especially as ISIS condition deteriorates.

Can they be stopped in the borders of Europe?

This is a question that has neither accurate nor obvious answer. Europe has to wisely allocate its resources to detect, track, monitor and surveil hundreds of jihadists who try to sneak in Europe – a daunting job even if everything worked fine. But difficulties in information sharing among secret services and other governmental entities, lack of coordination of law enforcement forces among the states and even political disputes on how to address the issue makes the effort less efficient. The matters are even worse because Europe is already vulnerable to the terrorist threat for reasons currently beyond control, namely close distance from war theatre, the big number of foreign fighters that are European citizens – nearly 6000 – the limited anti-terrorism capabilities and the big Muslim communities that live in European countries.

Is it only ISIS and its foreign fighters that pose a threat for Europe and the West?

The answer is no. Al – Qaeda is still there and it persists despite the challenges. Since 1988 when it was found in Afghanistan the organization has gone through major setbacks and serious blows but was always able to recover. Its operational capabilities to conduct attacks against the West peaked in the period 1998 – 2005. Some of the more spectacular of them during this period were the Twin Towers attacks, Madrid subway attack, the USA embassies attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the attack against USS Cole, the attacks in London, Istanbul, Jakarta, Riyadh and Casablanca. They left behind thousands of dead and injured people and the world watching in terror. After the charismatic leader of al – Qaeda Osama bin Laden was killed by US Special Forces

in 2011 the organization started to seriously weaken and unravel.

Today, under the leadership of al-Zawahiri is not in the forefront of the jihad as ISIS has taken the lead some years now. However, many scholars and experts believe that since al-Zawahiri took over in 2011 al-Qaeda has adopted a quiet and low profile strategy thus has significantly increased its strength and has expanded its reach and influence in a wide area covering Algeria, Libya and Tunisia in the West to as far as Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan,

Bangladesh and even Maldives in the East. Al-Qaeda is currently waiting for developments related to ISIS to unfold, namely ISIS to collapse, to decide next steps. There are already some developments observed lately in its leadership where the son of Osama bin Laden, Hamza, is promoted by other top commanders of the organization. This seems an indication of leadership change that is about to take place, maybe ahead of ISIS collapse or a possible merger of al-Qaeda and ISIS. This possible merger might be the most dangerous development after a

CONCLUSION

The ISIS collapse in Syria and Iraq will generate new threats for the West, a long period of uncertainty and increased terrorist activity worldwide because:

- 1. the foreign fighters now fighting with ISIS, will return to their countries of origin especially in western Europe, where they will want to continue their fight against the non-believers. This time they are battle hardened and experienced.*
- 2. re appearance of al-Qaeda as ISIS successor or a al-Qaeda – ISIS merger. There could also be a mix of Islamic groups with al-Qaeda as the principal. To inspire, increase its influence and gain support in the Muslim world the organization will instruct terrorist attacks against the West and western targets all*

grievous blow on ISIS. Is extremely concerning in the sense that it will allow al-Qaeda to exert control over ISIS networks in Europe which will maximise its power and influence over salafi – jihadist individuals residing in western countries.

It is believed that exactly the collapse of ISIS will be the triggering event for al-Qaeda's revitalization and total comeback as the organization will become the most appealing option for many of the fighters to continue the jihad. If eventually the charismatic Hamza bin Laden becomes its next leader, then

many more fighters will join al-Qaeda and public support in the Muslim world will surge. Moreover, if the West overreacts to terrorist attacks in western countries by imposing measures against Muslims thus enhancing the perception of a "war against Islam" al-Qaeda will surely take advantage of the opportunity to increase its influence in the Muslim world by punishing the non-believers waging jihad against them.

over the world especially if it takes control of the ISIS network in Europe.

In May 26, 2017 the Department of Homeland Security Chief, four star Army General John Kelly told Fox News: " if you knew what I know about terrorism you'd never leave the house in the morning."

Although it might not be all that bad we should always be prepared for every eventuality on all levels of our social life.

- 1. Comey Warns of Post-ISIL Terrorist Diaspora, Politico, 27 September 2016*
- 2. Foreign Fighters: an updated assessment on the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq, The Soufan Group, 8 December 2015*
- 3. Foreign Fighters: an updated*

assessment on the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq, The Soufan Group, 8 December 2015

. Where Do ISIS Fighters Go When the Caliphate Falls? The Atlantic, 6 March 2017

5. Prof. Bruce Hoffman "Al Qaeda: Quietly and Patiently Rebuilding", The Cipher Brief, 30 December 2016

6. Prof. Bruce Hoffman "Al Qaeda: Quietly and Patiently Rebuilding", The Cipher Brief, 30 December 2016

7. Prof. Bruce Hoffman "The Coming al Qaeda – ISIS Merger", Foreign Affairs, 29 March 2016

8. Tim Marcin "Terrorism in America", Newsweek, 26 May 2017, <http://www.newsweek.com/terrorism-america-knew-what-i-knew-you-d-never-leave-house-kelly-dhs-616317>



GET TO AWAKEBUS
HORI FACIEMQ UI.OMN
ERMIHILIS, NOSUS CO-
ERRA PUBLTATIAM EGI-
LIS HORSUM PERUM
DERO NOSUMA

DDUM VIDEMUS ES-
TEM, FORUM TERBI.GO
CONSUNT, TI. BIS HILNE
HILISTRI SE CONSULVIL
CONDIUS HACIT

DIMITRIS RAFTOGIANNIS

MARITIME TERRORISM

History, typology and contemporary threats

Maritime Security is a quite complex goal to achieve, due to the variety of threats and challenges it entails. At the high end of the spectrum of these challenges we can find the 'traditional' interstate disputes, mainly focused on the threat or the actual use of force against sovereign entities. The aforementioned threat of use of force is mostly linked to the external aggression due to maritime disputes, threats to States' sovereign rights or generalized armed conflicts, with the case of South China Sea being the most indicative contemporary example. The low end of the spectrum has to do more with law enforcement and transnational, cross-border maritime crimes and it involves mostly non-state rather than state actors. According to the UN¹ definition, these threats include illegal fishing, deliberate damage to the environment, trafficking related crimes by sea, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and finally maritime terrorism.

In this framework, this article will focus on maritime terrorism, aiming to provide a developed typology of the phenomenon and conclude with some useful recommendations from the authors' perspective.

The European Commission Joint Communication to the European parliament and the Council entitled "For an Open and Secure Global Maritime Domain: Elements for a European Union Maritime Security Strategy", defines maritime terrorism as "any violent act with political ends against

ships, cargo and passengers, ports and port facilities and critical maritime infrastructure".² The Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Working Group has offered a broader definition of maritime terrorism, which considers "...the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities."³

1- UN General Assembly (2008) 'Report of the Secretary General, Oceans and the law of the Seas', A/63/63.

2- For an Open and Secure Global Maritime Domain: Elements for a European Union Maritime Security Strategy", European Commission Joint Communication to the European parliament and the Council, 6 March 2014.

3- Guy Philip, "Maritime Terrorism", Centre for Security Studies Occasional Paper 2, University of Hull, 2011.



WE COULD IDENTIFY FOUR DIFFERENT FORMS OF MARITIME TERRORISM, BASED ON THE CRITERIA OF UTILISATION OF THE MARITIME SPACE AND THE SELECTION OF TARGETS

THE FOURTH AND PERHAPS MOST OBVIOUS TYPE, INVOLVES TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST SEAGOING TARGETS OF HIGH VALUE, WHOSE DESTRUCTION COULD SIGNIFY AN EFFORT TO CHALLENGE AND TRAUMATISE GREAT POWERS' PRESTIGE AND DOMINANCE AND THROUGH IT THE WESTERN PERCEPTION OF LIFE.

These definitions are by no means exclusive, they do not cover all possible scenarios and as such they are neither globally accepted nor a panacea. Yet, they form the basis to further discuss and debate the nature, typology and implications of the phenomenon, in order to better understand and address it respectively.

Terrorist tactics are unconventional and unpredictable by nature and highly dependent on innovation and surprise. Although the total number of maritime terrorism incidents recorder worldwide is very small, the international community considers the risk very high and the probability of more maritime terrorist attacks to occur as quite likely.

The 'SAGE Encyclopedia of Political Behavior'⁴ identifies four different forms of maritime terrorism, based on the criteria of utilisation of the maritime space and the selection of targets, while also examining its recent history and referring to some characteristic incidents.

The first type refers to the utilisation of the maritime space as the medium through which terrorist attacks could be possibly launched against land based targets. An indicative example of such an incident and of a major attack inland in particular, is the Mumbai bombings that took place on November 26, 2008. Ten terrorists in inflatable speedboats disembarked in

the port and carried out a series of twelve coordinated attacks.

The second type could include the use of ships to support capacity building for terrorist groups. For instance on January 3, 2002 the vessel *Karine A* was seized in the Red Sea, transporting armament for strikes against Israel.

The third type includes the hijacking of seagoing vessels and hostage taking of the passengers by terrorists in order to negotiate and achieve their political goals. Several maritime terrorism incidents of this type have occurred and the infamous hijacking of *Achille Lauro* in the Mediterranean is perhaps the most well-known. The incident occurred on October 7, 1985, when the Palestinian Liberation Front seized the Italian flagged cruiser *Achille Lauro*, off the Egyptian coast and held 511 passengers as hostages, demanding the release of Palestinian fighters from Israeli

jails. A wheelchair-bound Jewish-American passenger was killed and then pushed overboard during the incident. In a similar incident, Palestinian terrorists, belonging to Abu Nidal Organization, launched an attack against the Greek flagged cruiser *City of Poros*, on July 11, 1985. The ship was hijacked off the Aegina Island and nine tourists were killed, while another 98 were injured.

The fourth and perhaps most obvious type,

Terrorist tactics are unpredictable by nature and highly dependent on innovation and surprise,

4 - Noortmann, M. and Chapsos, I. (2017) 'Maritime Terrorism', *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Political Behavior*, Moghaddam, F.M. (ed), Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., pg.463



IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THERE HAS BEEN ONE SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST INCIDENT AGAINST A VESSEL; ON JULY 27, 2010, THE OIL TANKER M/V M STAR WAS ATTACKED IN A SIMILAR WAY TO USS COLE, WHEN A SPEEDBOAT DRIVEN BY A SUICIDE BOMBER CRUSHED ON IT AT THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, RESULTING IN INJURING ONE CREW MEMBER.

involves terrorist attacks against seagoing targets of high value, whose destruction could signify an effort to challenge and traumatise great powers' prestige and dominance and through it the western perception of life. The two more significant incidents of this type of maritime terrorism took place off Yemen in 2000 and 2002 respectively. More precisely on October 12, 2000, the US guided missile destroyer USS Cole was struck by an anchor handling skiff loaded with explosives in a suicide attack in the port of Aden. The casualties were 17 dead and 39 wounded, but beyond the significant death toll, it was the first time ever that a symbol of US military power suffered such an unprecedented blow at sea by a terrorist group. Furthermore, on October 6, 2002, again off Yemen, the French oil tanker M/V Limburg was attacked off Ash Shahir. This was another symbolic attack, against the Western exploitation of natural resources and dominance through economic prevalence. Despite that only one crew member was killed, there was an enormous ecological catastrophe with almost 100,000 tons of crude oil spilled into the Gulf of Aden. Al Qaeda took responsibility for both the aforementioned attacks.

Another noteworthy maritime terrorism attack took place in Manila Bay off Corregidor Island on

February 27, 2004 and the perpetrator was Abu Sayaf Group; it was the bombing of Super Ferry 14, which killed 116 people, making it probably the maritime terrorist act with the highest number of casualties ever. In the last five years, there has been one significant terrorist incident against a vessel; on July 27, 2010, the Oil Tanker M/V M Star was attacked in a similar way to USS Cole, when a speedboat driven by a suicide bomber crushed on it at the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in injuring one crew member. An Al-Qaeda affiliated group, Abdallah Azzam Brigades, took responsibility for the incident.

The above typology has been developed based on incidents and attacks which have occurred but following the 9/11 terrorist attack against the US, several scenarios that could have devastating implications have been considered. These scenarios include for example the use of a merchant

vessel beyond suspicion to transport a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in a major port, or the deliberate sinking of a similar vessel to close a major choke point and disrupt major sea lanes of seaborne trade and maritime transportation or the boarding and seizure of a superyacht or a cruiser full of passengers in order to negotiate a political goal. Scenarios of this kind urged the international

community to act proactively and develop conventions such as the SUA convention

**Scenarios
of this kind
urged the
international
community
to act
proactively**



THE GROUPS WHICH ARE STILL ACTIVE AND HAVE PROVEN THEIR INTEREST AND CAPABILITIES IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN ARE ABU SAYYAF GROUP, HAMAS, HEZBOLLAH, LASHKAR-E-TAIBA AND THE AFFILIATES OF AL QAEDA.

(Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation) and the ISPS code (International Ship and Port Facility Security Code as an amendment to the Safety of the Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention), in order to enhance port security and implement robust maritime security governance. Yet, the successful implementation of these conventions requires international cooperation and compliance at global level; their adoption has definitely been a significant step forward, but their efficiency and sufficiency remains to be seen.

Nowadays, some of the groups that in the past have demonstrated their maritime capabilities or intentions to use the maritime domain remain idle. In this category, we can find the Egyptian Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, which attacked cruisers in the Nile during the early 1990s, most Palestinian organisations, especially the Abu Nidal organization and the PLF responsible for the spectacular hijacking of city of Poros and Achille Lauro respectively, Free Aceh, which until its agreement with the Indonesian government back in 2005 had been especially "active" in the Strait of Malacca and of course the notorious Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which will be later further analyzed.

There are also smaller splinter groups from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and

Jemaah Islamiah mainly in Indonesia which could have the know-how and capabilities to conduct maritime terrorist attacks.

The groups which are still active and have proven their interest and capabilities in the maritime domain are Abu Sayyaf Group, Hamas, Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Taiba and the affiliates of Al Qaeda. The Lebanese group Hezbollah has received training in seaborne operations from the Iranian military and is deemed very effective. Abu Sayaf is always dangerous, especially after the Super Ferry 14 incident; Hamas has been using for a while the maritime domain and of course Al Qaeda has been the perpetrator of most attacks in the recent years. Allegedly Al Qaeda owned 15 to 20 ships, which would have been used for attacks but since this was never realized, we cannot be sure about the truthfulness of the information. Nowadays, the continuation of the extreme Islamist battle against the West is not Al

Qaeda (at least it is not the most dangerous group), but the Islamic State or Daesh. So far Daesh has refrained from using the maritime domain, but we cannot be certain about its future attacks.

We left LTTE as a special case study for the end of our analysis. The aforementioned group managed to operate a fleet comparable to a small state. It had Sea

battle regiments, Underwater demolition teams, the notorious Sea Tiger strike

**Allegedly
Al Qaeda
owned 15
to 20 ships,
which would
have been
used for
attacks...**



WHAT, WHEN AND WHERE SHOULD WE EXPECT AS FUTURE INCIDENTS? TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CAPACITY BUILDING OF DAESH, THIS HYBRID, WHICH IS QUASI-STATE AND ARMY AND QUASI- TERRORIST GROUP, A MARITIME TERRORISM INCIDENT IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND ESPECIALLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

groups, Marine engineering and boat-building unit, Radar and telecommunication unit, Marine weapons armory, logistics unit, reconnaissance team and intelligence section, even a Naval Academy/ Maritime school. The terrorist groups aspiring to create a state like Daesh are bound to seek for a navy, but this does not seem feasible in the near future.

What, when and where should we expect as future incidents? Taking into consideration the capacity building of Daesh, this hybrid, which is quasi-state and army and quasi-terrorist group, a maritime terrorism incident in the broader Middle East and especially in the Mediterranean Sea should be expected in the near future. The group has potential to launch maritime terrorism attacks, it is financially very strong due to extortions, illegal oil trade and illegal trafficking of cultural property and has a strong presence in the Libyan coasts and neighbouring countries.

The EU operation EUNAVFORMED-SOPHIA and the scheduled Operation in Libya (LIAM) when and if it takes place are bound to cause a reaction from the group, most likely in the maritime domain. As a parenthesis, we need to highlight that many European citizens became jihadists in Syria and other “local” wars under the Daesh banner and may play a crucial role

as regards maritime terrorism, especially nowadays that Daesh loses ground and is

in need of spectacular attacks to remain relevant. There are other factors that indicate the Mediterranean Sea as the future area of a maritime terrorist attack. The failure of the “Arab Spring” and especially the crackdown of the moderate Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt have also helped in the radicalization of youth with expertise in the maritime domain. The Med lies off Africa, Asia and Europe and thus to both the perceived terrorist and the perceived target. Actually, 60% of terrorist groups & half of all which have been involved in the past in maritime terrorism are extremely active in Med countries. The presence of vital Straits (Gibraltar, the Dardanelles and Suez Canal) makes it all the most possible to witness a maritime terrorist incident in the Med.

We expect the region of a potential terrorist incident (Med and probably close to Libya), we know the most possible perpetrators

(Daesh, or one of the Al Qaeda franchise in the region), we need to try to understand how and estimate when we are going to face such an incident. Both Al Qaeda and Daesh adore drama. They would probably want to achieve a spectacular attack, being faithful to the principle highlighted many years ago by the foremost expert in terrorism, Brian Jenkins:

The presence of vital Straits makes it all the most possible to witness a maritime terrorist incident in the Med.

“Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead”. Actually Daesh



A SUICIDE ATTACK AGAINST A TARGET IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN IS PROBABLY THE TYPE OF ATTACK WHICH IS BOTH IMPRESSIVE AND RELATIVELY EASY. IT CAN ALSO BE ACHIEVED BY A WELL ORGANIZED AND CENTRALLY GUIDED GROUP LIKE DAESH, BUT ALSO FROM SOME "LONE WOLVES".

prefers to record and upload a spectacular death, like burning someone alive, than thousands of deaths. The hijacking of a ship is hard to achieve but not impossible. A suicide attack against a target in the maritime domain is probably the type of attack which is both impressive and relatively easy. It can also be achieved by a well-organized and centrally guided group like Daesh, but also from some “lone wolves”.

As a parenthesis, we need to highlight that the absolute fragmentation of the Al Qaeda branches or associated organizations has led to a new kind of terrorism: the “armies of one” or “lone wolves”. Isolated radicals may decide to sacrifice themselves for their “cause”, without any instructions from any group and without any extensive training. Mohammed Merah assassinated seven people in Toulouse and Montauban, Michael Adebawale hacked to death a British soldier and two Chechen immigrants were responsible for the Boston Marathon bombing with three people killed and more than 250 wounded while the Nice Promenade des Anglais attack by a lorry was carried out by Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel leaving behind 87 dead and more than 400 injured. Of course, “lone wolves” are neither new nor solely Islamic in nature. Nonetheless, for the first time in history this trend seems to be becoming the official strategy, as explicitly and continuously

mentioned in Al Qaeda’s newspaper, “Inspire”.⁵ As regards the time of the possible maritime terrorist incident, we think that Daesh under tremendous pressure in Syria and Iraq will try to achieve such an attack as soon as possible, probably within a year; so the threat is imminent. There is no evidence to support this claim of course, other than hindsight.

As a conclusion, we think it is proper to provide some recommendations for countering the threat of maritime terrorism. Intelligence is the most important factor. Hence, we should have an information sharing mentality, a “responsibility to share”, instead of a “need to know” traditional approach, which unfortunately was reinforced by Wikileaks. The next recommendation is that the key players in the maritime domain - if they want to avoid catastrophic consequences - should understand the urgency and the need to cooperate closely in order to improve capabilities instead of just ignoring a grave threat. Last but not least, addressing the root causes of the phenomenon is always the best solution. We need to understand why someone commits suicide or fights with fanaticism, we need to see the mentality and address the grievances, or at least the ones that are logical, of the perpetrators.

► 5- Yigal Carmon and H. Migron, “New Trend in Al-Qaeda’s Recruitment Efforts: American Muslims Should Carry the Burden of Jihad in U.S.”, *Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.639, Middle East Media Research Institute, October 19, 2010*. More details can be found in Steven Stalinsky, “AQAP Releases Issues VIII and IX of Its English-Language Magazine ‘Inspire’, Calling for Lone-Wolf Jihad Attacks Targeting ‘Populations’; Permitting Chemical and Biological Weapons”, *Inquiry & Analysis Series Report No.831, Middle East Media Research Institute, May 7, 2012*.

It's time to start planning your crew training for 2018

Contact us for a free consultation and proposal

t: +1 786 406 6111

@: info@ads-superyachts.com

ASD-Superyachts.com

Headquarters:

201 S. Biscayne Blvd. 28fl

Miami - 33131FL

Education centers in Monaco.

Offices in America, Europe, and Asia

**Superyachts bespoke
security training programs
for captains and crews**

Supported by:

NAVIS





ASPIS

A valuable source of information about security, defense, training, and assistance on Superyacht security for Owners, Captains, and Crews.

Free subscriptions are available by filling the form at www.aspis-superyachts.com